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The fourth annual Kenneth M Piper Lecture was presented at
Chicago Kent College of Law on March 31, 1982. The featured
speaker was Roger R. Blanpain, Director of the Institute for Labor Re-
lations, University of Leuvan, Belgium. John T Dunlopformer Secre-
tary of Labor and present Lamont University Professor at Harvard
University chaired a distinguished panel of commentators. The other
members of the panel were Herman Rebhan, General Secretary of the
International Metalworkers Federation, Richard L. Rowan, Co-Direc-
tor of the Industrial Research Unit of the Wharton School at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, and Richard H Weise, Vice-President, General
Counsel and Secretary of Motorola, Inc.
The remarks of the speakers will bepresented in the order in which
they spoke. The remarks of thepanel in response to questions from the
audience are included The use of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development's (OECD) Guidelines is a central theme ad-
dressed by each speaker. For the convenience of the reader, the text of
the Guidelines is appended to this article.
ROGER R. BLANPAIN: Professor Collens, distinguished mem-
bers of the panel, ladies and gentlemen, dear students, may I first of all
express my sincere gratitude for your invitation and for your kind
words of introduction. I consider it a real honor and privilege to be
asked by this fine law school and the Piper Endowment to address you
this afternoon on an indeed challenging topic, the Transnational Regu-
lation of the Labor Relations of Multinational Enterprises. Before go-
ing into my speech, I'd like to make an introductory remark and give
some background information. Transnational Labor Relations are
only just emerging. Labor relation systems are still mainly national
and will, for a long time to come, be so. The fact that they will remain
national is true even in the context of the European Communities. Af-
ter twenty-five years of European Communities, the developments are
* Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Labor Relations, University of Leuvan,
Belgium; J.D.. University of Leuvan, 1956; M.A., Columbia University, 1957; Visiting Professor,
Michigan State University, University of Kentucky Law School; editor, Encyclopedia for Labor
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such that we still speak mainly of French, or German, or Italian labor
relations. So this afternoon we will study the exception, but exceptions
can and are important.
By way of background information, you should be aware of the
OECD and the European Communities. The OECD, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, is headquartered in Paris
and has twenty-four member countries. Among them are the United
States, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Turkey, and the Euro-
pean Community countries. The OECD, as you know, tries to promote
the free flow of capital and goods. Within the OECD internal organi-
zation some two hundred committees operate. One of those commit-
tees is the IME Committee, the Committee on International Investment
and Multinational Enterprises.
The IME Committee was created in 1975 to establish guidelines
for multinational enterprises and later on, once the guidelines were es-
tablished (as they were in 1976), to monitor the experience under the
guidelines. So the governments meet, discuss this experience, and ex-
change ideas. The governments meet with both the trade unions and
with the business community, each of which has an advisory status
with the OECD. Advisory opinions are submitted by TUAC, (Trade
Union Advisory Committee) which represents the trade unions of the
twenty-four member countries, and by BIAC (Business and Industry
Advisory Committee) which represents the employers' associations of
the twenty-four countries.
The IME Committee, when it meets in Paris, has formal and infor-
mal contacts with representatives of BIAC and TUAC. When the IME
Committee meets, the governments can ask questions of their fellow
representatives. They can introduce cases and the union and business
community representatives can also introduce cases. Each group can
ask questions and join in the discussion.
The IME Committee cannot make a judgment on the individual
behavior of a company. Instead, when cases are introduced, the cases
are introduced as an illustration of an issue and it is for the discussion
of an issue that the Committee then meets. The Committee eventually
issues a clarification of the Guidelines.
It is also important to have some background information on the
European Community (EC). As you know, there are ten country-mem-
bers of the EC; the latest member is Greece. There are several bodies
within the EC. The first is the Council of Ministers, which takes legis-
lative measures by consent. Next, there is the European Commission,
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or the European Government, whose members are appointed by the
Council of Ministers for a period of years. It is the Commission which
takes the initiative for introducing legislative measures. The European
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee are comprised of
representatives of unions, businesses and the so-called third group of
consumers and other interests. After all viewpoints have been consid-
ered, the Commission presents its final draft for legislation to the
Council of Ministers. The different countries' members, represented in
the Council, then negotiate. If they reach concensus, a legislative
measure can be taken. Those measures are called directives. A direc-
tive is a legally binding measure taken by the Council of Ministers
which sets a goal for the member countries. Each member country
then has to adopt national measures in order to implement that goal.
This afternoon we will also discuss a proposal on information and
consultation which is actually in Europe on the table before the Euro-
pean Parliament. It is a proposal regarding information to and consul-
tation of employees working in enterprises with a complex structure. It
is especially applicable to multinational enterprises.
OPPOSITE STRATEGIES
Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, transnational labor relations
are dominated by fundamentally opposed strategies developed by those
who are directly involved: by multinational enterprises on the one
hand and by trade unions on the other.
The basic problem has to do with the fact that multinational man-
agers want to remain as free and as flexible as possible in the manage-
ment of their enterprises. They want to continue to make decisions in
headquarters which escape the possible countervailing power of em-
ployees and of national governments. Multinational managers want to
be free to decide where to invest, where to disinvest, and what kind of
technology to use. These are decisions which are mostly made at cor-
porate headquarters.
The multinational strategy is consequently not to discuss any of
the problems involved at the transnational level with their employees.
The managers say, indeed, that there are no mransnational labor rela-
tions since all relevant decisions are made or can be made at the local
level-that is, in the country where the headquarters or subsidiary are
located. This is the point of view of most, if not all, multinationals, as
well as international employers' associations such as UNICE at the Eu-
ropean level, BIAC at the level of the OECD in Paris, and IOE (Inter-
CHICA GO KENT LAW RE VIEW
national Organization of Employers) at the ILO (International Labour
Organization) level in Geneva.
It is at the local level, at the level of the subsidiary, where employ-
ers insist that information has to be given, and where consultation and
negotiation have to take place. They say it must occur at this level to
take local law and practice into account. This is one strategy.
The other strategy is the one of the trade unions, who suggest that
the employers' attitude does not take into account that the most impor-
tant decisions in multinational enterprises are decisions involving
jobs-the number and quality of jobs, and, especially lately, collective
dismissals and closures in the framework of the restructuration process.
These decisions, the union movement says, escape the local grip and
the local social network. Trade unions indicate that they cannot ade-
quately defend the interests of their members unless they are allowed to
consult and to negotiate with the real decision-makers at the level
where decisions are made, and thus eventually at the multinational
level of headquarters.
So, you get two opposite strategies: multinationals saying that all
relevant problems have to be settled, dealt with at the local level and
unions indicating that there must be consultation and negotiation at the
transnational level with headquarters. Both parties are looking for
ways and platforms to achieve their goals.
ACTION By UNIONS
There are basically two ways for the trade union movement to pro-
mote their objectives in this area. The first is to rely on their own
strength, to rely on their industrial power, to push the employer on the
basis of industrial action (international solidarity, strikes, boycotts, etc.)
to recognize them and to consult and bargain with them.
Here, one must say, the international trade union movement has
dramatically failed for a number of well known reasons: their ideologi-
cal diversity, their lack of manpower and their opposed interests. The
trade unions have not succeeded in pushing the multinational enter-
prises to the transnational bargaining table.
The second method for the trade unions is to rely on the power of
someone else-on the power of their respective governments. They
must press their governments to develop, in the international arena,
rules adjusting the balance of power so as to force multinationals to
recognize them and to deal with them.
Here, obviously, the relationship between unions and political par-
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ties in power is of the greatest importance. Clearly, the picture has
dramatically changed, at least in Europe, in the last years from labor to
conservative in the United Kingdom, and from conservative to socialist
in France and elsewhere.
This is one-I underline one, since some governments and some
multinationals are independently looking for acceptable, reasonable
rules for behavior--of the reasons why we have codes of conduct for
multinational enterprises in the OECD, adopted in 1976, and by the
ILO, adopted in 1977. This is also the reason that there are similar
proposals in the EC and the United Nations. Those rules and codes
may provide for the trade unions a number of platforms enabling them
to force the other side to international negotiations.
Let's see how this has been tried in the OECD framework, where
there has been-up to now-the most experience, and how this relates
to the EC proposals on information and consultation.
THE OECD GUIDELINES
Let's have a look at the OECD Guidelines. The Guidelines were
adopted in 1976. They constitute a legislative recommendation. They
are accepted and supported by BIAC, the representatives of the busi-
ness and industrial community. They are also supported as a first step
by the trade unions. So, they have the backing of both sides of the
bargaining table. The Guidelines contain an introduction and seven
chapters; one chapter on General Policies, one chapter on Disclosure of
Information (where information must be given to the public on the
multinational enterprise as a whole), a chapter on Competition, a chap-
ter on Financing, a chapter on Taxation, a chapter on Employment and
Industrial Relations (which will obviously interest us the most this af-
ternoon), and a chapter on Science and Technology. It is a relatively
short document which was negotiated in a very short period of time.
The committee was created in 1975, and the document was accepted in
1976.
The Guidelines are voluntary. Paragraph 6 of the Introduction
states: "Observance of the Guidelines is voluntary and not legally en-
forceable." I never knew that the word voluntary had so many mean-
ings. For some countries, which will remain nameless, voluntary
means the text is acceptable or the text is not acceptable. The meaning
of voluntary becomes "do whatever you like." Most governments do
not share that view, I think, and say that the text is morally obligatory.
If morality is abiding by the principles of obligatory behavior, which
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society at large recommends enterprises follow, and if society is repre-
sented by democratically elected governments, consisting of the busi-
ness community and the trade unions, then we have to act according to
rules that are morally obligatory. The Guidelines supplement national
law and national practice, since otherwise the Guidelines would make
no sense in light of the fact that enterprises have to follow national law
and practice.
Let's consider some of the problems which have been presented to
the OECD. I will limit myself to three problems, namely those involv-
ing information to and consultation with employees, access to real deci-
sion-makers, and, finally, the co-responsibility of the parent company
for the operations of its subsidiaries.
Multinational Enterprise Consultation with Employees
When we look at national law and practice, we see that in gen-
eral-with the exception of a couple of countries--employees are in-
formed of company decisions at the local level of the work shop.
OECD Guidelines go a step further and indicate that employees are
entitled to have a true and fair view of the enterprise as a whole. Para-
graph 3 of the Employment and Industrial Relations chapter of the
Guidelines states that enterprises should work within the framework of
the law, regulations, and prevailing labor relations and employment
practices in each of the countries in which they operate, and should
"provide to representatives of employees where this accords with local
law and practice, information which enables them to obtain a true and
fair view of the performance of the entity or, where appropriate, the
enterprise as a whole." A similar principle can be found in the ILO
Declaration on Multinationals and in the EC proposed directive on in-
formation and consultation.
Article 5 of this proposed directive reads, in part, as follows: that
"1. At least every six months, the management of a dominant under-
taking shall forward relevant information to the management of its
subsidiaries in the Community giving a clear picture of the activities of
the dominant undertaking and its subsidiaries taken as a whole."
This means that a Works Council in Paris should be informed
about what happens with a company subsidiary in Brazil. The man-
agement of each subsidiary is required to communicate such informa-
tion to the representatives of the employees. When the management of
the subsidiary fails to do so, then the employees are entitled to address
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themselves to the management of the dominant undertaking. Thus, an
international opening is created.
Guideline 6 of the OECD chapter on Employment and Industrial
Relations foresees that multinational enterprises should:
in considering changes in their operations which would have major
effects upon the livelihood of their employees, in particular in the
case of the closures of an entity involving collective lay-offs or dis-
missals, provide reasonable notice of such changes to representatives
of their employees, and where appropriate to the relevant govern-
mental authorities, and co-operate with the employee representatives
and appropriate government authorities so as to mitigate to the maxi-
mum extent practicable adverse effects.
It is obvious that the expression, "changes in operations" must be
broadly interpreted and that the Guidelines do not only apply to clo-
sures and collective layoffs, but also to other structural changes, for
example mergers, provided that they have a major effect on the liveli-
hood of the employees. The wording of the phrase "in considering
changes" would seem to indicate a stage prior to the final decision.
Again, specific circumstances of each case have to be taken into ac-
count. Especially compelling reasons of business confidentiality may
prevent early information, but this should be the exception rather than
the general rule. It goes without saying that headquarters also has a
definite obligation to provide local management with the necessary in-
formation in reasonable time so as to enable the local managers to
comply with Guideline 6.
The EC proposals are more precise, but again, we get the same
technique. Article 6 states that when the management of a dominant
undertaking proposes to act on a decision concerning the whole or a
major part of the dominant undertaking, or of one of its subsidiaries,
which is liable to have a substantial effect on the interests of its employ-
ees, it shall be required to forward precise information to the manage-
ment of each of its subsidiaries within the Community, not later than
forty days before adopting the decision. The notice must give the de-
tails of the grounds for the proposed decision, the legal, economic and
social consequences of the decision for the employees concerned and
the measures planned in regard to these employees. The decisions re-
ferred to shall be those relating to the closure or transfer of an estab-
lishment or major parts thereof; restrictions, extensions or substantial
modifications of the activities of the undertaking, major modifications
with regard to organization, the introduction of long-term cooperation
with other undertakings, or the cessation of such cooperation.
Here, again, headquarters has to inform the local manager, who
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has to inform and consult with the employees. Here, again, there is an
international opening since, if no information or consultation with lo-
cal management takes place, then the local employees are entitled to
information from and consultation with a view of reaching agreement
with top management.
It is especially in this area that the EC proposals are attacked most
vehemently by employers. A real fight is taking place in European
capitals between defenders and opponents of the EC proposals.
The employers argue that the proposal lacks a legal basis and that
the European Commission is over-reaching the legal possibilities under
the enabling Treaty. Internationalization of labor law is, they argue,
not a goal of the EC. It is only where different, territorially limited
legal systems disturb the realization of the goals of the Treaty that the
European Community is entitled to propose a measure favoring har-
monization. This is not the case in respect to information and consulta-
tion, they argue. The proposal of consultation deters foreign
investment, makes the position of EC multinationals more difficult ver-
sus the Japanese, asks for too much and unnecessary information, does
not take into account the real decision-making structure of the multina-
tional, is too simplistic in assuming that everything is decided at the
top, undermines the authority of local managers, undermines the
OECD and ILO codes of conduct, and will affect the necessary flex-
ibility of a multinational enterprise.
The trade unions, on the other hand, defend the directive vehe-
mently, especially the legally binding character of the proposal. They
refute the arguments of the employers and refer to the OECD Guide-
lines as a "paper tiger" or a "fig leaf." The debate is currently continu-
ing in the European Parliament, where one involved commission was
in favor (94 pro, 80 against, 37 abstentions) and in the Economic and
Social Committee, where a majority for the directive was also found.
Access to Real Decision-Makers
The second important problem concerns the access to real deci-
sion-makers. Here we must go to Guideline 9 of the Employment and
Industrial Relations chapter of the OECD Guidelines which provides
that employees should have access to real decision-makers. This prin-
ciple is a basic one, which should cover all labor relations of the enter-
prise, including negotiation as well as consultation. It seems self-
evident that employees must be able to consult with managers who are
authorized to make the decisions necessary to mitigate adverse effects.
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The expression "authorized to make decisions" has self-evidently
a universal meaning. Someone who has authority is more than a mere
messenger, more than a go-between. It means that he has the power to
determine the content of the decision to be made, the wages to be paid,
the hours to be worked, whether to invest or disinvest and the like.
There are, of course, certain limitations. The manager must take the
broad principles of company policy into account, and he may have to
report to the Board of Trustees or what have you, but the point is the
permission should not have to be sought at every step.
Normally, that "authority" will usually be "delegated" authority.
The question is then: Can all decision-making power be delegated to
local managers? Theoretically, one can say yes, but for some issues
there has to be someone who possesses a more global view of the enter-
prise. Here the decision-making structure of the multinational enter-
prise comes into play. Of course, this structure is complicated; of
course, there is an input from below, from the local manager. But this
does not change the fact that it is possible to indicate who has the main
authority to make decisions.
It is self-evident that most multinational enterprises have a cen-
tralized decision-making process concerning investment and technol-
ogy and creation and control of pension funds. One cannot reasonably
say--except perhaps for really big subsidiaries-that investment and
other major decisions are mainly made by local management. To the
extent that decisions are actually made at the centralized level rather
than by the local manager, then delegation becomes a fiction and local
employees are not able to talk with real decision-makers. If invest-
ment, technology, and pensions are bargainable issues following na-
tional law or practice, and those decisions are mainly made at the
international level, then employees are entitled to negotiate or to con-
sult with this multinational centralized management.
The OECD clarified Guideline 9 on the occasion of a disinvest-
ment case in Sweden, the Viggo case, as follows:
In carrying out their responsibilities, management of the enterprises
as a whole would seem to have a range of possibilities, among which
it would choose or that it could combine, taking into full account the
need to respect prevailing labor relation practices in the country
where the negotiations have been initiated. Its choice depends on
various circumstances, such as the matters under discussion, the deci-
sion-making structure within the enterprise, and the importance of
the decisions to be taken. A number of possibilities are open to this
end without suggesting any order of preference. Examples of such
possibilities include: to provide the management of the subsidiary
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with adequate and timely information and to insure that it has suffi-
cient powers to conduct meaningful negotiations with representatives
of employees; to nominate one or more representatives of the deci-
sion-making centre to the negotiating team of the subsidiary in order
to secure the same result as in the preceding example; to engage di-
rectly in negotiations.
Thus a new opening for transnational labor relations was created.
The OECD further indicated that employees in this context "have a
legitimate interest to be informed about the decision-making structure
within the enterprise." I think this is a landmark clarification.
Co-responsibility of the Parentfor Obligations of the Subsidiaries
The third and last problem is an especially important one: it con-
cerns the co-responsibility of the parent for the obligations of the sub-
sidiaries. The main question is whether there is financial responsibility
on the part of headquarters for the debts of its subsidiaries? Can a
multinational enterprise invoke the principle of limited responsibility
of a company? That principle is a basic one for the twenty-four coun-
tries in OECD. It means that if I create a company and I want to invest
$100,000, that is the money I want to invest, to risk. My responsibility
is limited to that. Can one, in such a multinational, still invoke the
principle of a limited responsibility, meaning that each legal entity of
the multinational group is only liable to the extent of its assets?
Discussion of this problem was triggered by an important case, the
Badger case. In the Badger case, the question was raised concerning
what conditions must exist for a mother company to be obligated to
pay the debts of its bankrupt daughter. The issue was raised by the
Belgian government. Badger was located in Belgium and was a subsid-
iary of an American entity. Badger closed down, dismissed 250 em-
ployees and filed in bankruptcy. According to Belgian law, employees
are entitled to compensation in such an instance. Badger Belgium,
however, did not have sufficient money to pay compensation and the
American parent refused to pay, invoking the principle of limited
responsibility.
It was the position of the Belgian community as a whole, not only
of the unions, not only the political parties, but informally also of the
employers, that limited responsibility could only be invoked when the
subsidiary is legally autonomous. The Belgian position was that there
should be co-responsibility when a subsidiary is fully controlled and
fully run by the parent company.
The Belgian government found its argument in Paragraphs 7 and 8
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of the Introduction to the OECD Guidelines. Paragraph 7 reads: "The
entities of a multinational enterprise located in various countries are
subject to the laws of these countries." So, the Belgian government
said, the Belgian affiliate is subject to the law of Belgium. Thus, the
subsidiary should pay compensation.
Paragraph 8 of the Introduction says: "For these reasons, the
Guidelines are addressed to the various entities within the multina-
tional enterprise (parent companies and/or local entities) according to
the actual distribution of responsibilities among them on the under-
standing that they will cooperate and provide assistance to one another
as necessary to facilitate observance of the Guidelines." The Belgian
government said, (a) the local subsidiaries must pay, and, (b) the parent
and local entities must cooperate and assist each other in observing the
guidelines according to the actual distribution of responsibilities.
The OECD stated, in agreement with the arguments developed by
the Belgian government, that while the Guidelines do not imply an un-
qualified principle of parent-subsidiary responsibility, there is a princi-
ple of qualified responsibility. The responsibility is qualified by the
relationship between the parent company and the subsidiary. For ex-
ample, in cases of 100% ownership, such as the Badger case, it is impor-
tant to consider the extent to which decisions are made by headquarters
and the conduct of the parent company. The OECD stated that the
responsibility of the parent company could be of particular relevance in
the circumstances set out in Guideline 6 of the Chapter on Employ-
ment and Industrial Relations relating to important changes in the op-
eration of a firm, and the cooperation required concerning the
mitigation of resulting adverse effects.
The OECD's conclusion on the co-responsibility of the parent for
the affiliate is of the utmost importance in establishing standards of
behavior and responsibilities which go beyond national law. This is the
very "raison d'etre" for the Guidelines. This step by OECD, although
important, is undoubtedly but a first step. More experience under the
Guidelines is needed with more cases and issues to see whether the
principle of co-responsibility, still an exception to the general rule, can
evolve in the direction of a more far-reaching responsibility of the par-
ent for the daughter, thus bridging the gap between the law and eco-
nomic reality.
A TENTATIVE LOOK TO THE FUTURE
There are other cases which are important but which I have not
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touched upon because time is a factor. To conclude, I will just speak
briefly about a tentative look to the future. An overall evaluation of
the transnational exercise, especially of the Guidelines, is difficult since
there are positive as well as negative experiences. Let's start with the
negative aspects. First, the Guidelines do not yet live at the grass-root
level. They are still widely unknown. Second, the actual support by
enterprises, such as indications in their annual reports that they support
the Guidelines, is meager. Third, economic crisis plays a role. In the
beginning, governments introduced problems and issues. Now, no one
wants to scare investment away and each prefers to take a low profile.
. At the same time, there are very positive things to be reported.
This is especially true at the top level in the OECD, where collabora-
tion between governments, employers, and unions-I repeat at the
top-has resulted in a lot of ground being covered and a good deal
realized. Guidelines have been negotiated, cases and issues have been
discussed and clarified among member countries, an elaborate follow-
up procedure has been set up. There has been real impact on labor
relations and the beginning of an elaboration of an international labor
relations system.
I would not have thought in 1975, when I was engaged in a study
for the OECD on these matters, that all this would have been possible
in so short a time, that a realistic framework to resolve difficult and
delicate problems in a reasonable, peaceful way could come into being
and function. Whether the impact of the Guidelines and transnational
labor relations will grow depends largely on the use made of them,
especially by labor representatives. Of particular importance will be
the introduction of cases and issues at the OECD as well as at the ILO.
By way of evaluation, one has to keep in mind that the "great" grows
slowly, that Paris and Chicago were not built in one day, that the
Guidelines and related issues are just out of the starting blocks.
Let me conclude by leaving you with a thought by the good Pope
John XXIII: "Order, security and peace of each country are necessarily
connected with the social progress or the security and peace of all coun-
tries. At the present day, no political community is able to pursue its
own interests and develop in isolation." These words are very apropos
today in the area of labor relations.
HERMAN REBHAN* : Mr. Blanpain, Mr. Dunlop, ladies and
* General Secretary, International Metalworker's Federation; Director, World Auto Coun-
cil Department, United Automobile Workers Union (UAW), 1966; Administrative Assistant to
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gentlemen, I want to thank Mrs. Piper for sponsoring this lecture series.
I once worked for the Motorola Company when it was still on 4545
Augusta Boulevard. I assembled control heads for automobiles; I am
delighted to have returned to this distinguished audience. Let me say
that this is a powerful idea indicated by Professor Blanpain, and there's
a powerful and vicious campaign in progress to not only oppose, but to
discredit, the initiative by the common market that we are supposed to
be discussing here today.
If you will permit me, I will cite just a few examples: the Honora-
ble Senator Sims of Idaho, who sponsored a bill to nullify the initiative,
says, and I will quote, "that Europeans are ingrates who fail to recog-
nize the benefits to the economic health of Europe of the activities of
U.S. firms." And there is a nice lobbying firm known as Fisher, Pepp
and Bogendbull, in Washington, that urges that the United States re-
duce U.S. defense commitments to NATO if the Europeans undercut
U.S. economic interests. They're talking about EC. Senator Sims also
said the actions of the EC are outside the scope of the Treaty of Rome.
In October of this last year, the American firms who control half of
the industrial capital of EC, namely eighty billion dollars worth, have
shown they are not without means of applying pressure. Recently the
Wall Street Journal had an editorial which said: "Is Brussels sprout-
ing?" The legislation is actually very mild. This opposition reminds
me of the little story that's told about several elderly ladies sitting on
the porch of the spinster home and rocking in rocking chairs and
watching the chickens in the yard. A rooster began chasing a hen. And
the hen ran out on the road and was killed. "See, Elsie," one of the
women said, "she'd rather die." Looks like some of our multinational
corporations would rather die than accept some regulations.
For those of you who are representing corporations here today,
and those of you who are going to graduate from this school and going
to represent businesses, let me give you a word of caution: once each
generation, American business has an opportunity to exert public lead-
ership rather than defend itself against the public. And the U.S. mul-
tinational corporations have such an opportunity now. Will they use
it? If the past is any guide, the answer is probably no. American busi-
ness had such opportunities in the 1880's with the invention of mass
production in modern corporations. And the failure of business to re-
spond resulted in anti-business legislation covering a broad range of
UAW President Walter Reuther, 1969-72; Director, UAW International Affairs Department, 1972-
74; author, Trade Unions and the World.
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topics from the Federal Trade Commission to laws governing wages
and hours. Here in the City of Chicago, I think we ought to remember
Upton Sinclair's great book about the stockyards.
And then there was a second opportunity, and that was in the
1920's. After returning a measure of trust during World War I, busi-
ness failed to respond to the post-war demands of labor and investors
and consumers, and foreshadowed the New Deal legislation. I think
lawyers were probably happy with the New Deal legislation, because it
created the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Communica-
tions Commission and the laws protecting consumers.
The third opportunity was in the early 1960's. Government mone-
tary policies presumed that we were going to have a continuously ex-
panding economy. Again business failed to seize the initiative of
public concern about the environment, consumer safety, or equal em-
ployment opportunities. And you know what happened.
Overseas recently, when Germany was discussing co-determina-
tion law, the American Chamber of Commerce issued a paper saying
that this was contrary to the 1948 Peace Treaty with Germany. I will,
of course, simplify the situation. I think it's fair to say that the anti-
business activity has been activated largely by the business community,
the only difference being the amount of public concern.
When we discuss how we should handle a multinational corpora-
tion, or as the United Nations terminology calls it, transnational corpo-
rations, it reminds me that I used to sit across the bargaining table right
here in the General Motors plant not far from this city, about forty
years ago, and negotiate. We let the power lie with the foreman or the
superintendent. But the same cannot be said for the millions of work-
ers who now work for multinational corporations all over the world.
Often when they try to approach local management for sound dis-
cussion, they are told that the decision is being made back in New York
or Detroit and the local manager apologizes. And when a plant shuts
down, even for an economically justifiable reason, there is tremendous
bitterness if the decision is made in a far away country. I don't want to
moralize about the behavior of multinational corporations, they are not
inherently evil, but for them it's the bottom line that counts, just like it
counts at the grocery store at the corner. The trade union movement
has to develop a new strategy and new tactics to handle the multina-
tional corporations. As the Professor has pointed out, we are seeing the
development of international codes and international practices, and
policies laid down by such international bodies as the OECD, the ILO
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and others. None of these codes are going to transform the behavior
patterns of multinational corporations overnight. Some are so loosely
worded or so impossible to believe, that they have no direct impact.
There are others, like the code here proposed by the European Eco-
nomic Community, or the code that already exists for South Africa by
the European Economic Community, or the Sullivan Code used in the
United States, which have some modest effect in putting companies
under pressure to temper the worst parts of the hard times in the work-
ing place.
I don't want to over-emphasize these codes. In many cases, unions
can be as supicious of these codes as the companies because of the reg-
ulations. But there is a subtle, slow moving, irreversible trend towards
increased international regulation of international manufacturing and
marketing operations. One of the important actors in this field is the
Common Market Commission in Brussels. Clearly they can only affect
the ten member countries of the EC, but since these countries include
the most powerful industrial nations outside North America and Japan,
what the EC does is of great importance.
Now, at the moment there is a campaign that has been pointed out
within the EC to make compulsory the provisions of information about
company plans of investment and employment through the unions or
to the workers' representatives. The companies, especially the Ameri-
can multinationals, are opposed to it, while the trade union movement
is strongly hurting.
I feel that such disclosure of information would help change the
relationship between workers and employers and introduce a great deal
of cooperation in what is still, in many countries, a relationship based
on confrontation.
Now, the idea is nothing new. Already many European countries
have a national legislation which requires companies, including subsid-
iaries of multinational corporations, to provide certain categories of in-
formation. And I personally am privy to a lot of this information
because I happen to sit on the Board of the Ford Motor Company of
Germany as a workers' representative. I don't go around telling this
information to reporters. It means that my colleagues on the union side
have to be informed in making decisions. There is, predictably, hostil-
ity from employers and right-wing politicians to the Common Market
proposal on information disclosure.
If you read the Wall Street Journal, the bureaucrats of Brussels are
depicted as clouded subversives when, in fact, they are cautious con-
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servatives and anxious to keep afloat a set of economic policies which is
presently drifting close to a rock. And they reckon collectively, in my
view, that people who overcome their difficulties are more successful if
they are put fully into the picture rather than treated as simpletons who
are there to work obediently and take their paycheck home at the end
of the week. But let me say that the days when the multinationals are
weakly involved in the ruling of sound international regulatory bodies
is going to be a long time in coming, and in the meantime, business is
business.
However, let me say, on the brighter side, that multinational com-
panies are not immune to learning. In West Germany, for instance,
multinational companies have to live with the West German system of
industrial democracy. Young managers come over to West Germany
for tours and find that having workers on the Board does not mean the
end of capitalism and it does not mean the end of profitability. In fact,
far from it. After they have done their tour of duty in Germany, I hope
they will be educated in the idea that industrial democracy and cooper-
ation within Europe in terms of stability, and in terms of increased
trade and world economic growth, is important. It is important that
multinational companies are unionized by national and international
trade unions. Multinational companies can do what they want, like so
many are by making their super profits, but they are also stoking the
fires of anger amongst the people. As Americans, we need only look at
Central America, with decades of social and economic injustice, and
decades of exploitation which have made the whole region ripe for left-
wing takeovers. Multinational companies have often allied themselves
with totalitarian governments of suppression. Without unions to act as
intermediaries, people will take more radical, more violent paths to ob-
tain social justice.
While I'm not holding out, at the present time, for the negotiations
of mobile contracts, I do believe that multinational corporations have
got to be willing to sit down and talk with international union groups.
So far they have resisted. Let me just remind the American audience
that fifty years ago American companies resisted national agreements,
multi-plan contracts, paid vacations, paid health insurance, et cetera, et
cetera. They learned their lesson, and I think they will learn their les-
son about the need and usefulness of talking to international unions.
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I think, Mr. Chairman, I have more things to say, but I believe my
time is up and I thank you very much.
RICHARD L. ROWAN*: The strategies of multinational firms and
unions are opposite in some respects; however, one can detect a certain
amount of convergence in their respective strategies, if it can be pre-
sumed that both have an ultimate interest in providing an optimal set
of employment conditions. It is true that the multinational firm, almost
without exception, reflects an attitude that industrial relations should
be practiced under a set of national and/or local determinants because
this is where the interface between employers and employees occurs.
Employers strongly oppose the international regulation of industrial re-
lations, which they consider will interfere with the most effective repre-
sentation of employee interests at the national and local levels. On the
other hand, international trade union bodies such as the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the European Trade
Union Confederation (ETUC), and the International Trade Secretari-
ats, such as the International Metalworkers' Federation (IMF), the In-
ternational Federation of Commercial, Clerical, Professional and
Technical Employees (FIET), and the International Transport Work-
ers' Federation (ITF), believe that the international regulation of in-
dustrial relations is essential for the protection of employee interests in
general. It would appear, however, that national and local union offi-
cials, on occasion, may not see direct benefits arising out of transna-
tional bargaining or a remote set of international industrial relations
guidelines.
MULTINATIONAL BARGAINING
Professor Blanpain refers to international bargaining as a dramatic
failure. I find it difficult to come to such a conclusion or even to evalu-
ate an activity which has not been accomplished. Multinational collec-
tive bargaining has existed only as a figment of a fertile imagination.
In the early 1970's, Charles Levinson, Secretary General of the Interna-
tional Chemical and Energy Workers' Federation based in Geneva,
shocked many of us by announcing that multinational collective bar-
gaining would be the wave of the future and that he had consummated
* Professor of Industry and Co-Director, Industrial Research Unit, Wharton School, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania; A.B., Birmingham-Southern College, 1953; Ph.D., University of North
Carolina, 1961; author, Multinational Collective Bargaining Attempts.. The Record, the Cases and
the Prospects; Multinational Union Organizations in the Manufacturing Industries, "Readings in
Labor Economics and Labor Relations."
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such an arrangement with the St. Gobain Company, a French glass
manufacturing concern headquartered in Paris. In my judgment, Lev-
inson did the international trade union movement a disservice by mak-
ing unsubstantiated claims. In my private conversations with
international trade secretariat officials during the past ten years, I have
not detected much interest in multinational collective bargaining. Her-
man Rebhan, General Secretary of the International Metalworkers'
Federation, summed it up as follows in a speech given in Brussels in
November of 1981:
I have just read a six-hundred page book by Professor Rowan of
the University of Pennsylvania which is devoted to multinational col-
lective bargaining attempts, and at the end of this exhaustive volume
I think that the message Professor Rowan is trying to put over is that
there is no such thing as multinational collective bargaining. I would
not dissent from his conclusion.
And I say that with no feeling that we have failed in achieving a
target set by an earlier generation of international trade union
leaders.
Instead of meeting the multinationals on the terrain of their own
choosing--that is a war of words on the global scale-we have opted
for a strategy of putting pressure on the vulnerable points of the
MNC activities in the individual countries where they are situated.
Even the most superficial examination of the legal, social, polit-
ical, and cultural systems of OECD countries, let alone countries in
the developing world, will show such enormous differences that the
search for a system of common bargaining is a will of the wisp.
Research that has been conducted over the past decade by my col-
leagues and me at the Wharton School substantiate Rebhan's state-
ments. The reasons why multinational bargaining has not developed
can be summarized under four headings: varying law and practice,
management opposition, union reluctance, and lack of employee
interest.
Discussions pertaining to multinational collective bargaining by
those who have not understood either the union or the corporate posi-
tion have obscured the goals that have been achieved by international
trade secretariats in representing their national affiliates. Union bodies
have also been effective in pushing for the development of codes of
conduct at the ILO, OECD, UN, and EC. It is clear that the European
Trade Union Confederation has been the major supporter of the
Vredeling proposal for a "Directive on procedures for informing and
consulting employees of undertakings with complex structures," which
is currently being discussed in Brussels.
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OECD GUIDELINES
Codes of conduct to regulate activites of multinational firms have
been in vogue since the mid-1970's. The rationale for the OECD
Guidelines can be explained by publicity given to alleged malpractices
on the part of some multinational firms in the early 1970's, interna-
tional union support, and a movement by the ILO to formulate a code
of conduct. The OECD evidently desired to issue the first set of Guide-
lines hoping to protect business interests.
The issuance of the Guidelines led to the creation and activation
of various bodies within the OECD. The Commmittee on Interna-
tional Investment and Multinational Enterprises (CLIME) is responsi-
ble for supervision of work conducted under the Guidelines. Business
interests are represented before the CIIME by the Business and Indus-
try Advisory Committee (BIAC), and labor's interests are represented
by the Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC).
Representatives on the CIME are drawn from national govern-
ment echelons and usually come from agencies whose work pertains to
finance and investment. Since the Employment and Industrial Rela-
tions section of the Guidelines appears to have generated the most ac-
tivity for the CLIME, it is surprising that practically no labor relations
representatives have been appointed to the committee. Indeed, even
the BIAC has been sorely lacking in industrial relations expertise. The
difficulty arising from this situation is that the significance of technical
and practical labor problems discussed before the committees by trade
unionists and others may not be fully understood. Many times the nu-
ances of industrial relations issues are quite subtle, and they are likely
to be overlooked or improperly evaluated by those not in the field.
Needless to say, the trade unions were anxious to seek interpreta-
tion of the Employment and Industrial Relations Guidelines once they
were issued. I think that it augurs well for the practice of industrial
relations at the national and local levels that there have been relatively
few cases of any substance brought before the OECD committee since
1976. Initially, the IMF filed some ten cases alleging misconduct on the
part of various multinational firms with very little follow-up.' These
cases were followed by about ten others, including those discussed by
I. See International Metalworkers' Federation, "Complaints on the Policy of Multinational
Companies Calling for Application of OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Some
First Indications About the Impact of the Code on the Industrial Relations at World Level,"
(cases submitted by IMF through TUAC, March I1, 1977).
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Professor Blanpain: Badger (Belgium), Hertz (Denmark), Viggo (Swe-
den), and Philips (UK).
What has happened in terms of the further protection of employee
interests as a result of the Guidelines and the cases mentioned? Factu-
ally, the answer can only be "very little." The reason for this perhaps is
that each of the Guidelines is preceded by an important chapeau clause
that reads: "Enterprises should within the framework of law, regula-
tions and prevailing labour relations and employment practices, in
each of the countries in which they operate .... , ,2
Emphasis continues to be placed on the practice of industrial rela-
tions at the national and local levels and, almost without exception, the
disputes that have arisen under the Guidelines have been settled under
existing national laws and practices. There has been only one case
where a challenge has led to refinement of the language in the Guide-
lines. The Hertz case resulted in considerable attention during the re-
view of the Guidelines in 1979, and it also led to the only textual
change made as a result of the review. As the OECD presently
prepares for the 1982 mid-term review of the Guidelines, there is dis-
cussion pertaining to the issue raised in the Viggo case on interpreta-
tion of Paragraph 9 covering access to decision-makers in the
multinational firm.
If the international codes of conduct have had little impact on em-
ployee interests at the rank and file level, what has been their signifi-
cance? They have been used by the international union movement to
support broader union goals. Publicity pertaining to the cases has led
to union pressure for the establishment of binding guidelines and legis-
lation. This has been evident most recently in the pressure placed by
the European Trade Union Confederation on the European Commis-
sion for the passage of the Vredeling proposal.
VREDELING PROPOSAL
The Vredeling initiative is much different than the voluntary
OECD Guidelines. As an EC Directive, it would be an enforceable
piece of legislation with European-wide implications. The draft Direc-
tive specifies that the member states "shall introduce the laws, regula-
tions and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this
Directive within two years of its notification." (Article 17.1).
2. OECD, "Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Employment and Industrial Rela-
tions," Annex to the Declaration of 21 June 1976 by Governments of OECD Member Countries
on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises.
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While employers have given at least some support to the OECD
Guidelines, they are totally opposed to the Vredeling initiative. A re-
view of the circumstances surrounding the development of the Vredel-
ing proposal would lead one to believe that employees and
multinational corporations would have little to gain through the pas-
sage of this proposal. I realize that Professor Blanpain and Herman
Rebhan would disagree with my statement. The IMF has recently ad-
vised its affiliates to rally support for the proposal and Professor
Blanpain has headed a hearing at Leuvan concerning the Vredeling
proposal in which Mr. Vredeling was given the opportunity to defend
his proposal before representatives from multinational companies and
members of the European Parliament. An industry spokesman at the
hearing stated "that if the Directive were adopted it would harm the
image of the EEC and would worsen the competitive position of Euro-
pean industry."
The European employers' federation, UNICE, has stated:
The proposal is based on a faulty appreciation of the operation of
complex structure undertakings and their industrial relations. It does
not take sufficient account of national methods in the field of indus-
trial relations so that it would conflict with, rather than supplement,
these arrangements.
Furthermore, the proposed directive, the need for which has not been
shown by the Commission, would adversely affect the proper work-
ing of enterprises in the Community. It would undermine the flex-
ibility which is needed in running an enterprise and would thus
diminish the competitive capacity of European enterprises and have
a depressing effect on investment in the Community. It would im-
pose on complex structure undertakings the duty to provide em-
ployee representatives with information, the relevance of which for
the employees concerned has not been established. Finally it would
discriminate against parent companies established in the Community
since extending the obligation to parent companies established in
non-Member Countries would involve insuperable legal and political
obstacles.
3
National employer groups have also taken a very firm stand
against Vredeling as evidenced by the following statement from the
Federation of German Employers Associations:
German industry is not prepared to accept the radical alterations in
the Works Constitution Act, company law and co-determination law,
which would become necessary as a result of this draft directive, and
for this reason categorically rejects the concept of the draft directive.
Owing to the fact that the principle of the EEC draft extends well
3. UNICE, Department of Legal and Fiscal Affairs, "Draft opinion on the Directive," Nov.
27, 1980.
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beyond the German Works Constitution Act, German industry can-
not envisage any sort of proposals which might make this draft more
practicable and acceptable.4
It is this complete lack of consensus that leads me to believe that, if
passed, the Vredeling proposal would face little likelihood of successful
implementation. I can understand how the international unions may
benefit politically, but I cannot understand how employees will benefit
economically from a law that threatens an employer's ability to make
decisions that are necessary for continued operations. Given the wide
variety of national laws and practices and the various Codes of Con-
duct, employers do not see the necessity of yet another piece of enforce-
able legislation.
Regardless of employer opposition, it now appears that the union
strategy, principally that of the European Trade Union Confederation,
is beginning to yield results and some type of Vredeling proposal may
be recommended by the European Parliament. This will be a major
victory for the ETUC which has an objective of establishing a prece-
dent for community-wide social legislation. Once this has been accom-
plished, the ETUC looks forward to its main mission--community-
wide works councils, consultation, and multinational collective bar-
gaining legislation.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In summary, it would appear that my views and the views of Pro-
fessor Blanpain differ in the following ways: (1) whereas Blanpain ap-
pears to look upon the multinational firm as an institutional
arrangement that may occasionally benefit society with the possibility
of doing considerable harm, my view is that the multinational firm
makes a considerable contribution to society and may occasionally
cause harmful dislocations; and (2) whereas Blanpain appears to place
faith in compulsory guidelines which eventually will be incorporated
into national legislation, my view is that voluntary guidelines and the
practice of industrial relations at national/local levels are more desira-
ble and will lead to a more effective representation of employee
interests.
It must be remembered that international confederations of labor
represent national federations of unions and international trade secre-
tariats represent national union affiliates in various parts of the world;
4. Federation of German Employers Associations, Federation of German Industry, "Opin-
ion on the EEC Commission Proposal," COM (80) 423 (Oct. 23, 1980).
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as such, these organizations do not represent employees directly and
they have an institutional life of their own. Representation of employ-
ees remains a matter of concern to national and local unions or their
counterparts in various countries. International trade secretariats, in
particular, play an important role in supporting the continuing activi-
ties of national unions on a country-wide basis. However, it would be
practically impossible for them to supplant the activities of their na-
tional affiliates. Of course, they understand this even better than those
who continue to write about them with the distorted impression that
the secretariats are really seeking multinational collective bargaining
and attempting to usurp the traditional functions of those whom they
may represent.
RICHARD H. WEISE*: I find myself agreeing with everything that
Professor Blanpain and Mr. Secretary Rebhan said this morning ex-
cept-and this exception follows the lead of Mr. Rebhan's animal
story-not the rooster and the chicken-but the mouse that was over-
heard talking to the cat. "I think it is a marvelous idea except the part
about having me for breakfast."
First certain disclaimers are necessary. In the introduction we
were described by the moderator as a distinguished international labor
panel. I will not deny being distinguished, but I am not an interna-
tional labor lawyer. I am a "garden variety" corporate lawyer. You
may then ask why am I here? My understanding is that my role is to
provide a corporate perspective of the effects that these proposals might
have in a "real world" situation.
First, however, it might be helpful for you to know a bit about my
perspective. My client, Motorola, is a company best known for a prod-
uct that it hasn't made for eight years, that is, television sets. However,
it does make communications equipment; a full range of semi-conduc-
tor products, information systems and computers, government electron-
ics, and automotive electronic products. This year it will probably near
the four billion dollar mark in sales. Motorola is, therefore, essentially
an industrial electronics company. Given this background, and being a
conservative corporate lawyer type (and also feeling a bit like the
mouse talking to the cat), I am not going to admit that Motorola is a
multinational corporation. However, it does have some thirty major
* Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary, Motorola, Inc.; B.A., DePauw Univer-
sity, 1956; J.D., DePaul University, 1961.
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plant facilities throughout Europe, Asia, Canada, and Latin America.
It also has between seventy and eighty thousand employees worldwide.
Given that backdrop, I would like to turn to a discussion of a cor-
porate lawyer's perspective of the Vredeling proposal. Two principles
which weave their way through the Vredeling proposal, the OECD reg-
ulations and guidelines, and the United Nations Code are, Information
for and Consultation with employees of foreign-based subsidiaries on
key issues which might affect their employment.
It also has been noted at the outset that in order for this "Informa-
tion" to be useful and in order for the "Consultation" to be effective,
the subsidiary employee has to know about the parent company's plans
well in advance of their implementation.
Allow me to suggest at the outset that these twin principles, while
appearing philosophically appealing at first blush, become a hoary
hobgoblin when an attempt is made to translate them to operational
terms, particularly in an international setting.
Allow me also to point out as a predicate, that American Busi-
ness-and most particularly my company-has continually been a
champion of communications with its employees. Following this ax-
iom, Motorola has enjoyed an unparalleled record of employee rela-
tions success and labor peace. It has been a pioneer in the concept of
"Participative Management" and has voluntarily implemented a com-
plex worldwide system of communications with its employees for the
express purpose of having their active and effective participation in the
management of their company.
Given this Motorola belief in employee communication, one
might ask why I perceive difficulties with the Vredeling, OECD, UN
and ILO proposals.
The problem is not in the intent of these proposals but, rather, the
problem is in the obligatory and inflexible manner in which they are
expressed and suggested for implementation. The matter is further ex-
acerbated when one contemplates similar proposals which could be
adopted by third world countries.
Let me be specific and discuss several significant problems that
would be created for U.S. Industry.
Trade Secrets and Confidentiality
America's high technology industry is struggling to survive in a
highly competitive world marketplace. Industrial espionage actually
does occur and those firms operating at the leading edge of their tech-
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nology are particular targets. To the uninitiated, this may sound like a
fantasy of "cops and robbers," but to the manager of confidential
processes, the keeper of trade secrets, and the marketing strategists,
these are genuine concerns. A corporation may not be able to compete
in the world marketplace if it has to share, as it would under the pro-
posals, its "advanced production and investment programmes," its pro-
duction "rationalization plans," its "manufacturing and working
methods," the "introduction of new working methods" and "all proce-
dures and plans liable to have a substantial effect on employees'
interests."
Further, in many high technology businesses, timing is everything.
Pricing follows a technology learning curve, and successes in early
product introduction and availability can spell long-term success or
failure. Each technology change involves an intricate series of deci-
sions and building blocks before a product can be designed, produced
and brought to the market in an effective manner. Our point, here, is
that the legitimate desires of employees for information have to be bal-
anced with the equally legitimate needs of high technology industry to
protect its secrets and confidential information.
United States Securities Laws
A second problem associated with giving employees information
about the company and its plans for the future, arises out of the United
States securities laws. Because of these laws, and because of the prac-
tices and inclinations of American companies, American industry al-
ready provides not only our employees but the whole world with a
tremendous amount of information. This information, both textual
and numerical, is required to be disclosed by the securities laws and the
various stock exchange regulations. Given these parameters, one has to
be impressed with the quality and quantity of information contained in
annual reports, 10K, IOQ and 8K reports and all of the other registra-
tions and filings regularly made. The information given is admittedly
meant to be of use to the investor as opposed to the employee but, all in
all, a United States company provides incredible amounts of informa-
tion to the public-infinitely more than any typical European company
does. If we were to add to this intricate system of public disclosure and
begin to provide information to employees including forecasts of pro-
duction, sales, employment and investment programs, we would most
certainly run into conflicts with the United States securities laws.
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I will attempt to review a few potential conflicts, but time doesn't
permit more than a mere listing.
In the Vredeling proposal, information is to be provided as to the
structure and manning of the local enterprise. This includes economic
and financial information such as the potential development of busi-
ness, production plans and sales forecasting.
The federal securities laws, however, effectively discourage Ameri-
can companies from forecasting their production, investment, sales or
earnings. They do this by creating enormous liabilities to present and
prospective shareholders when such forecasts turn out to be inaccurate
or merely unattainable, notwithstanding contrary statements by the
staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission. 5 Again, this is a sub-
ject in and of itself, and this audience might profit from a panel on the
subject of corporate liability to shareholders arising out of forecasting
and the subject of the management of information disclosures in
general.
In any event, the present statutory scheme of the United States
securities laws requires a total reorganization of thought to move from
a system of prescribed disclosures to shareholders to a system of disclo-
sures to employees of a given local unit of the company in Germany,
for example. Given the notions of the Vredeling proposal, it is under-
standable that these employees might find it desirable to receive predic-
tions as to what may transpire elsewhere in the company and attempt
to relate those predictions to what may happen in Germany. But even
if one believes that such would be a commendable idea, how can we
rationalize and accomodate the mandating of the U.S. securities laws
on disclosures?
The Fragility of Transactions
I would like to now focus on the element of the Vredeling proposal
which requires information to and consultation with a company's local
employees about decisions which are "liable to have a substantial effect
on the interests of its employees." This directive mandates that an em-
ployer give local employees 40 days notice of such a decision, along
with precise details, including its rationale and the legal, economic and
social consequences to employees. Assume that the decision is to close
one plant, double the capacity of another plant, and go out of business
5. See the "safe harbor rule" for forecasting; Rule 3b-6 of the SEC's General Rules and
Regulations Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; see also the principal SEC release dis-
cussing Rule 3b-6; Release No. 34-9984; CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 23,508.
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in one entire product line. The problems that would be created by the
requirement to give 40 days advanced notice (public disclosure) per-
haps can be best shown by providing a quick profile of such a transac-
tion. I do not know how many in this audience have been involved in
corporate transactions involving the purchase and sale of companies
and so forth, but, out of competitive necessity, it is a business reality
that American industry engages in such endeavors.
The nature of corporate acquisitions and dispositions is that they
are often conceived just days before they are consummated. As an ex-
ample, consider a hypothetical company's decision to go out of the tele-
vision business-worldwide. One does not know if there is a customer
out there for a $400 million business. However, common sense (as well
as the securities laws) dictates that it may not be a good idea to send a
letter to your employees in Germany announcing that you have de-
cided to go out of the television business. Confidentiality and speed are
the bywords of these fragile transactions. If the news does get out and
if a company is delayed (40 days or more), the buying public may not
be interested in its products. Distributors and dealers may abandon the
company in favor of a competitor. Key employees (who are often the
best and most marketable employees) may be out looking for jobs. A
company may not have a business to sell forty days after it has made
such a public announcement.
In quick review, then-it is the fragility of major transactions, pos-
sible violations of the U.S. securities laws and concerns over preserva-
tion of confidentiality and trade secrets which cause many corporate
observers to be troubled by these proposals.
I think that I will end on that note. It is a shame that there is so
little time to discuss such a large subject, but I thank you for your
attention.
PANEL DISCUSSION IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS
FROM THE AUDIENCE
JOHN T. DUNLOP*: Ladies and gentlemen, I am sure that my
colleagues and the panel would love to add more. But I do think you
have been very good, and patient, and it would be most unfair not to
permit members of the audience to ask some questions in the limited
* Lamont University Professor, Harvard University; A.B., University of California, 1935;
Ph.D., University of California, 1939; LL.D., University of Chicago, 1968; LL.D., University of
Pennsylvania, 1976; Director, Cost of Living Council, 1973-74; Secretary of Labor, 1975-76; edi-
tor, The Lessons of Wage and Price Controls-The Food Sector, Labor in the Twentieth Century,
Business and Public Policy.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
time we have left to members of the panel. I am sure in commenting
upon your questions, they may kind of clatter a little response to each
other. So, who would like to ask the first question?
QUESTION: This question would be to whoever is representing
the employers. How are employees to effectively bargain collectively
over decisions that affect their livelihood unless they are given informa-
tion concering the decision-making process?
MR. DUNLOP: I take it by definition he was talking to you, Mr.
Weise. I wouldn't want to preclude anyone else from representing that
point of view.
MR. WEISE: First of all, you have to make a determination as to
those things that employees should participate in and those things that
they should not. And I think the question has to be asked in a perspec-
tive of what kind of information you are talking about. If you are talk-
ing about information having to do with production, about decisions as
to how something is going to be done, something within the realm,
within the grasp, within their day-to-day operating activities, then a
company that is run well will tap its employee input and make it possi-
ble for them to participate whether it be a union environment or a non-
union environment. This is happening to a greater and greater extent
all of the time.
If you are talking about a question as to whether or not a product
should be manufactured in Germany or Brazil, I think that many
would say that the employees of Germany, from whence the produc-
tion facility is going to be transferred to Brazil, don't have anything to
contribute to that decision. As these people have said, it is the decision-
makers who have the whole picture that have to make that decision.
MR. REBHAN: If I may just comment, and I am not representing
the employers here, I think we spoke about the entity to be sold in
Brazil. There is not a word, not an inkling, of some social responsibil-
ity that these corporations have to the people that work for them.
There is nothing in there. There is no social responsibility. Besides, if
Motorola has a plant in Germany, it has to give this information, it is
not violating any SEC laws by doing this. I think these things are done.
The Ford Motor Company has to tell whether they are going to trans-
fer production. They are not violating any SEC laws.
I think these are phantoms that are created, imagining that as soon
as the Vrede/ing proposal passes, and it will pass in some form or an-
other in Europe because the time has come, that American corpora-
tions will not adjust themselves to it. They will operate profitably
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under it, and they will continue to make money, and capitalism will not
come to an end. Capitalism survives because we modify it from time to
time-because unions and other good people modify it.
QUESTION: I have a question for Professor Blanpain. Granted
in the transnational situation it is difficult to get multinational corpora-
tions to act in accordance with the Guidelines that have been promul-
gated, but suppose they do act in accordance with the Guidelines, and
you interpret consultation to mean negotiations, what sanctions or
guarantees are there that negotiations will be conducted in good faith
and there won't be surface bargaining, for instance?
PROFESSOR BLANPAIN: If I understand the questions cor-
rectly, you are asking how do you see to it that negotiations are bona
fide negotiations? The Guidelines are adding to national law where the
transnational situation requires it. The decisions are taken at a local
level; local men can duly inform the Council. It is only when decisions
are taken in other countries that it should indicate there be timely in-
formation so that local law and local practice will be lifted. Now what
negotiation means, what consultation means, what has to be bargained
about at the local level, is purely and completely a matter of national
law. The Guidelines try to see to it that this becomes meaningful. So,
whether it will be bona fide or non-bona fide is a matter for national
law to decide.
MR. REBHAN: In the German law which deals with bargaining
committees, there is a section that provides for a committee on social
problems. That committee is informed every six months at least about
the status of the plant, what the prospects of the plant are, and what the
financial status is. This has been done since 1952 and the American
companies have done quite well.
PROFESSOR BLANPAIN: I was a little bit surprised when the
representative of Motorola said that there would be problems with the
Security Exchange Commission. It is news to me. All of those points
are already covered in the Guidelines. Therefore, I do not see why
there is a problem. I can assure him that the American government
carefully watches every word which is said to see that the SEC laws are
not violated. We have eight Americans sitting there doing their job
beautifully.
MR. WEISE: I'd like to give somebody a great Law Review arti-
cle and I will give it free. The problem, as far as securities law is con-
cerned is not whether or not you can give the information out. The
company can give information out about itself. The problem arises in
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areas where you are asked to project what your employment is going to
be, what your sales are going to be, in essence, what your operations
are going to be in the future. This carries with it certain perils because
if you project wrong, your stockholders will get mad at you; your stock-
holders will sue you. The Security and Exchange Commission may ask
you what your basis was for this projection of your operation. So, the
solution that I think I can say all American companies have adopted is
not to make projections of what their performance is going to be in the
future, but to give reflections of the past and of right now, and let the
shareholder make the determination from the body of information. If
you give the projecting type information that is called for in the propos-
als, such as the Vredeling proposal, to the representatives of the em-
ployees in a given country, there are provisions that they are supposed
to keep the information a secret. The provisions are very unclear as to
what happens if they don't.
PROFESSOR BLANPAIN: The confidentialities are written in
the test.
MR. WEISE: We understand it should be confidential but how do
you keep it confidential?
MR. REBHAN: The German law provides for penalties.
MR. WEISE: We don't care what the penalty is, but the leaker of
the information suffers if the information leaks. Then we are faced
with a first class securities law problem.
MR. DUNLOP: I'm interested as to how in normal business, to
distinguish between a leakee and a leaker. Who will care to have the
last question?
QUESTION: My question is directed to Mr. Weise. Can you am-
plify at all as to the securities law violations. I just don't understand
from what you have said which provisions are violated.
MR. WEISE: There is a basic premise that if you disclose mate-
rial, important information to anyone, it has to be disclosed to every-
one on the same basis. All investors must have the same ability to have
that information. It is referred to as the "tipping law." You can't leak
tips to your brother-in-law to go out and buy stock on the eve of an
important event that is taking place. Therefore, control of the informa-
tion which you give to the public is very important and there are laws
that cover it. As a result, if a company were required to give informa-
tion, let's say projecting-type information, to the employee representa-
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tive in Germany, a prudent company would feel that it had to give that
projecting-type information to everyone.
QUESTION: What would be wrong with that?
MR. WEISE: What would be wrong with that is that the way the
securities laws are currently configurated in the United States, project-
ing performance, earnings, profit, sales and so forth into the future is
too dangerous. It will be subject to litigation from individual litigants,
and from the Securities Exchange Commission. It is not done.
Take a look at the annual report of any of a number of companies,
and it will be filled with information. There will be lots of financial
information which bears on last year, and not what is going to happen
next year.
MR. DUNLOP: Ladies and gentlemen, I think that I do not want
to be responsible for retaining you from the reception which is to fol-
low this program. I am sure, however, that you will join me in expres-
sing our gratitude for what has really been an interesting introduction
to a field of growing importance and significance, for the lecture we
had from Professor Blanpain, and for the contributions from our three
panelists, who commented on what was said and other aspects of the
subject that occurred to them-thank you Herman Rebhan, Richard
Rowan, and Richard Weise. I am delighted to ask you to join me in
expressing our thanks to all of them.
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Text of the OECD Guidelines
ANNEX
TO THE DECLARATION OF 21 JUNE 1976 BY GOVERN-
MENTS OF OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES ON INTERNA-
TIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
1. Multinational enterprises now play an important part in the econ-
omies of Member countries and in international economic rela-
tions, which is of increasing interest to Governments. Through
international direct investment, such enterprises can bring sub-
stantial benefits to home and host countries by contributing to the
efficient utilization of capital, technology and human resources
between countries and can thus fulfill an important role in the
promotion of economic and social welfare. But the advances
made by multinational enterprises in organizing their operations
beyond the national framework may lead to abuse of concentra-
tions of economic power and to conflicts with national policy
objectives. In addition, the complexity of these multinational en-
terprises and the difficulty of clearly perceiving their diverse struc-
tures, operations and policies sometimes give rise to concern.
2. The common aim of the Member countries is to encourage the
positive contributions which multinational enterprises can make
to economic and social progress and to minimize and resolve the
difficulties to which their various operations may give rise. In
view of the transnational structure of such enterprises, this aim
will be furthered by co-operation among the OECD countries
where the headquarters of most of the multinational enterprises
are established and which are the location of a substantial part of
their operations. The Guidelines set out hereafter are designed to
assist in the achievement of this common aim and to contribute to
improving the foreign investment climate.
3. Since the operations of multinational enterprises extend through-
out the world, including countries that are not Members of the
Organization, international co-operation in this field should ex-
tend to all States. Member countries will give their full support to
efforts undertaken in co-operation with non-Member countries,
and in particular with developing countries, with a view to im-
proving the welfare and living standards of all people both by en-
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couraging the positive contributions which multinational
enterprises can make and by minimizing and resolving the
problems which may arise in connection with their activities.
4. Within the Organization, the programme of co-operation to attain
these ends will be a continuing, pragmatic and balanced one. It
comes within the general aims of the Convention on the Organi-
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
and makes full use of the various specialized bodies of the Organ-
ization, whose terms of reference already cover many aspects of
the role of multinational enterprises, notably in matters of inter-
national trade and payments, competition, taxation, manpower,
industrial development, science and technology. In these bodies,
work is being carried out on the identification of issues, the im-
provement of relevant qualitative and statistical information and
the elaboration of proposals for action designed to strengthen in-
ter-governmental co-operation. In some of these areas procedures
already exist through which issues related to the operations of
multinational enterprises can be taken up. This work could result
in the conclusion of further and complementary agreements and
arrangements between Governments.
5. The initial phase of the co-operation programme is composed of a
Declaration and three Decisions promulgated simultaneously as
they are complementary and inter-connected, in respect of guide-
lines for multinational enterprises, national treatment for foreign-
controlled enterprises and international investment incentives and
disincentives.
6. The Guidelines set out below are recommendations jointly ad-
dressed by Member countries to multinational enterprises operat-
ing in their territories. These Guidelines, which take into account
the problems which can arise because of the international struc-
ture of these enterprises, lay down standards for the activities of
these enterprises in the different Member countries. Observance
of the Guidelines is voluntary and not legally enforceable. How-
ever, they should help to ensure that the operations of these enter-
prises are in harmony with national policies of the countries
where they operate and to strengthen the basis of mutual confi-
dence between enterprises and States.
7. Every State has the right to prescribe the conditions under which
multinational enterprises operate within its national jurisdiction,
subject to international law and to the international agreements to
which it has subscribed. The entities of a multinational enterprise
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located in various countries are subject to the laws of these
countries.
8. A precise legal definition of multinational enterprises is not re-
quired for the purposes of the Guidelines. These usually com-
prise companies or other entities whose ownership is private, state
or mixed, established in different countries and so linked that one
or more of them may be able to exercise a significant influence
over the activities of others and, in particular, to share knowledge
and resources with the others. The degree of autonomy of each
entity in relation to the others varies widely from one multina-
tional enterprise to another, depending on the nature of the links
between such entities and the fields of activity concerned. For
these reasons, the Guidelines are addressed to the various entities
within the multinational enterprise (parent companies and/or lo-
cal entities) according to the actual distribution of responsibilities
among them on the understanding that they will co-operate and
provide assistance to one another as necessary to facilitate obser-
vance of the Guidelines. The word 'enterprise' as used in these
Guidelines refers to these various entities in accordance with their
responsibilities.
9. The Guidelines are not aimed at introducing differences of treat-
ment between multinational and domestic enterprises; wherever
relevant they reflect good practice for all. Accordingly, multina-
tional and domestic enterprises are subject to the same expecta-
tions in respect of their conduct wherever the Guidelines are
relevant to both.
10. The use of appropriate international dispute settlement mecha-
nisms, including arbitration, should be encouraged as a means of
facilitating the resolution of problems arising between enterprises
and Member countries.
11. Member countries have agreed to establish appropriate review
and consultation procedures concerning issues arising in respect
of the Guidelines. When multinational enterprises are made sub-
ject to conflicting requirements by Member countries, the govern-
ments concerned will co-operate in good faith with a view to
resolving such problems either within the Committee on Interna-
tional Investment and Multinational Enterprises established by
the OECD Council on 21 January 1975 or through other mutually
acceptable arrangements.
Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the Member countries
set forth the following Guidelines for multinational enterprises with the
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understanding that Member countries will fulfil their responsibilities to
treat enterprises equitably and in accordance with international law
and international agreements, as well as contractual obligations to
which they have subscribed:
General Policies
Enterprises should
1. take fully into account established general policy objectives of the
Member countries in which they operate;
2. in particular, give due consideration to those countries' aims and
priorities with regard to economic and social progress, including
industrial and regional development, the protection of the environ-
ment, the creation of employment opportunities, the promotion of
innovation and the transfer of technology.
3. while observing their legal obligations concerning information,
supply their entities with supplementary information the latter may
need in order to meet requests by the authorities of the countries in
which those entities are located for information relevant to the ac-
tivities of those entities, taking into account legitimate require-
ments of business confidentiality;
4. favour close co-operation with the local community and business
interests;
5. allow their component entities freedom to develop their activities
and to exploit their competitive advantage in domestic and foreign
markets, consistent with the need for specialisation and sound com-
mercial practice;
6. when filling responsible posts in each country of operation, take
due account of individual qualifications without discrimination as
to nationality, subject to particular national requirements in this
respect;
7. not render-and they should not be solicited or expected to
render-any bribe or other improper benefit, direct or indirect, to
any public servant or holder of public office,
8. unless legally permissible, not make contributions to candidates for
public office or to political parties or other political organizations;
9. abstain from any improper involvement in local political activities.
Disclosure of Information
Enterprises should, having due regard to their nature and relative size
in the economic context of their operations and to requirements of
business confidentiality and to cost, publish in a form suited to improve
CHICAGO KENT L4W REVIEW
public understanding a sufficient body of factual information on the
structure, activities and policies of the enterprise as a whole, as a sup-
plement, in so far as is necessary for this purpose, to information to be
disclosed under the national law of the individual countries in which
they operate. To this end, they should publish within reasonable time
limits, on a regular basis, but at least annually, financial statements and
other pertinent information relating to the enterprise as a whole, com-
prising in particular:
(i) the structure of the enterprise, showing the name and location
of the parent company, its main affiliates, its percentage own-
ership, direct and indirect, in these affiliates, including share-
holdings between them;
(ii) the geographical areas' where operations are carried out and
the principal activities carried on therein by the parent com-
pany and the main affiliates;
(iii) the operating results and sales by geographical area and the
sales in the major lines of business for the enierprise as a
whole;
(iv) significant new capital investment by geographical area and,
as far as practicable, by major lines of business for the enter-
prise as a whole;
(v) a statement of the sources and uses of funds by the enterprise
as a whole;
(vi) the average number of employees in each geographical area;
(vii) research and development expenditure for the enterprise as a
whole;
(viii) the policies followed in respect of intra-group pricing;
(ix) the accounting policies, including those on consolidation, ob-
served in compiling the published information.
Competition
Enterprises should
while conforming to official competition rules and established policies
of the countries in which they operate,
1. refrain from actions which would adversely affect competition in
the relevant market by abusing a dominant position of market
power, by means of, for example,
(a) anti-competitive acquisitions,
1. For the purposes of the guideline on disclosure of information the term 'geographical
area' means groups of countries or individual countries as each enterprise determines it appropri-
ate in its particular circumstances. While no single method of grouping is appropriate for all
enterprises, or for all purposes, the factors to be considered by an enterprise would include the
significance of operations carried out in individual countries or areas as well as the effects on its
competitiveness, geographic proximity, economic affinity, similarities in business environments
and the nature, scale and degree of inter-relationship of the enterprises' operations in the various
countries.
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(b) predatory behaviour toward competitors,
(c) unreasonable refusal to deal,
(d) anti-competitive abuse of industrial property rights,
(e) discriminatory (i.e. unreasonably differentiated) pricing and us-
ing such pricing transactions between affiliated enterprises as a
means of affecting adversely competition outside these
enterprises;
2. allow purchasers, distributors and licensees freedom to resell, ex-
port, purchase and develop their operations consistent with law,
trade conditions, the need for specialization and sound commercial
practice;
3. refrain from participating in or otherwise purposely strengthening
the restrictive effects of international or domestic cartels or restric-
tive agreements which adversely affect or eliminate competition
and which are not generally or specifically accepted under applica-
ble national or international legislation;
4. be ready to consult and co-operate, including the provision of in-
formation, with competent authorities of countries whose interests
are directly affected in regard to competition issues or investiga-
tions. Provision of information should be in accordance with safe-
guards normally applicable in this field.
Financing
Enterprises should, in managing the financial and commercial opera-
tions of their activities, and especially their liquid foreign assets and
liabilities, take into consideration the established objectives of the




1. upon request of the taxation authorities of the countries in which
they operate, provide, in accordance with the safeguards and rele-
vant procedures of the national laws of these countries, the infor-
mation necessary to determine correctly the taxes to be assessed in
connection with their operations, including relevant information
concerning their operations in other countries;
2. refrain from making use of the particular facilities available to
them, such as transfer pricing which does not conform to an arm's
length standard, for modifying in ways contrary to national laws
the tax base on which members of the group are assessed.
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Employment and Industrial Relations
Enterprises should
within the framework of law, regulations and prevailing labour rela-
tions and employment practices, in each of the countries in which they
operate,
1. respect the right of their employees to be represented by trade un-
ions and other bona fide organizations of employees, and engage in
constructive negotiations, either individually or through employers'
associations, with such employee organizations with a view to
reaching agreements on employment conditions, which should in-
clude provisions for dealing with disputes arising over the interpre-
tation of such agreements, and for ensuring mutually respected
rights and responsibilities;
2. (a) provide such facilities to representatives of the employees as
may be necessary to assist in the development of effective col-
lective agreements;
(b) provide to representatives of employees information which is
needed for meaningful negotiations on conditions of
employment;
3. provide to representatives of employees where this accords with lo-
cal law and practice, information which enables them to obtain a
true and fair view of the performance of the entity or, where appro-
priate, the enterprises as a whole;
4. observe standards of employment and industrial relations not less
favourable than those observed by comparable employers in the
host country;
5. in their operations, to the greatest extent practicable, utilize, train
and prepare for upgrading members of the local labour force in co-
operation with representatives of their employees and, where ap-
propriate, the relevant governmental authorities;
6. in considering changes in their operations which would have major
effects upon the livelihood of their employees, in particular in the
case of the closure of an entity involving collective lay-offs or dis-
missals; provide reasonable notice of such changes to representa-
tives of their employees, and where appropriate to the relevant
governmental authorities, and co-operate with the employee repre-
sentative and appropriate governmental authorities so as to miti-
gate to the maximum extent practicable adverse effects;
7. implement their employment policies including hiring, discharge,
pay, promotion and training without discrimination unless selectiv-
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ity in respect of employee characteristics is in furtherance of estab-
lished governmental policies which specifically promote greater
equality of employment opportunity;
8. in the context of bona fide negotiations' with representatives of em-
ployees on conditions of employment, or while employees are exer-
cising a right to organise, not threaten to utilise a capacity to
transfer the whole or part of an operating unit from the country
concerned nor transfer employees from the enterprises component
entities in other countries in order to influence unfairly those nego-
tiations or to hinder the exercise of a right to organize;
9. enable authorized representatives of their employees to conduct ne-
gotiations on collective bargaining or labour management relations
issues with representatives of management who are authorized to
take decisions on the matters under negotiation.
Science and Technology
Enterprises should
1. endeavour to ensure that their activities fit satisfactorily into the
scientific and technological policies and plans of the countries in
which they operate, and contribute to the development of national
scientific and technological capacities, including as far as appropri-
ate the establishment and improvement in host countries of their
capacity to innovate;
2. to the fullest extent practicable, adopt in the course of their busi-
ness activities practices which permit the rapid diffusion of technol-
ogies with due regard to the protection of industrial and
intellectual property rights;
3. when granting licenses for the use of industrial property rights or
when otherwise transferring technology do so on reasonable terms
and conditions.
I. Bona fide negotiations may include labour disputes as part of the process of negotiation.
Whether or not labour disputes are so included will be determined by the law and prevailing
employment practices of particular countries.

